Should a customer's AI assistant be allowed to sign up for them?

Start from the uncomfortable part. Every fraud signal the industry has built is a proxy for "is a human here", and a capable AI agent genuinely has the things those proxies measure. It drives a real browser, so the fingerprint is real. It arrives on a residential connection, so the address is clean. It controls a real mailbox, so it receives the verification code. It is not defeating your checks; it is satisfying them. So detection is an arms race you lose slowly, and the useful question is a different one.

1. 1

   Stop asking whether it is a bot

   "Is this automated" has become a bad question, because a growing share of legitimate traffic is somebody's assistant doing what they explicitly asked it to do. Refusing that refuses a customer who is standing right there. The question that still has an answer is: on whose authority is this acting, and can they be held to it?

2. 2

   Verify the agents that identify themselves

   Web Bot Auth is the emerging standard for this — RFC 9421 HTTP Message Signatures, with an IETF working group chartered in early 2026 and Cloudflare, Google, Amazon and OpenAI behind it. The agent signs its request with a key its operator publishes at a well-known URL, and you check the signature. This is the one check in fraud detection with no false-positive rate, because it is arithmetic rather than judgement. Increasingly agents do sign, because operators want their traffic accepted.

   the request|bash

   curl -X POST "https://www.layercall.com/v1/agent/authorize" \
     -H "X-Api-Key: YOUR_KEY" -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
     -d '{
       "method": "POST",
       "url": "https://yoursite.com/signup",
       "headers": { "signature": "…", "signature-input": "…", "signature-agent": "…" }
     }'

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3. 3

   Use trigger, not user agent, to tell them apart

   An operator's Signature Agent Card declares a trigger with exactly two values: fetcher, meaning a person initiated this request, and crawler, meaning nobody did. That distinction is invisible to every classical signal — both are "a bot", and both may be perfectly signed — and it is the whole game. A customer's assistant filling in a signup because they asked it to is a customer. An autonomous crawler POSTing to the same endpoint on nobody's behalf is not, and never was.

   the request|js

   const r = await score({ ip, email, device_id, agent: { method, url, headers } });
   
   // proven is true for exactly one thing: a signature that verified.
   if (r.actor.proven && r.actor.type === "verified_agent") {
     if (r.actor.trigger === "fetcher") return allow();   // a person asked for this
     if (req.method !== "GET")          return reject();  // nobody asked for this
   }

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4. 4

   Separate what you can prove from what you inferred

   A verified signature is proof. Headless detection and automation markers are inference, and inference a capable adversary patches in an afternoon. Keep those apart in your own code, because the moment they are the same field you will start treating a guess like a certainty — and acting automatically on a guess is how you refuse real customers. Branch on a single boolean that means "this was settled cryptographically", not on a vocabulary.

5. 5

   Catch volume with linkage, not with identity

   Signing does not make an agent harmless. Someone can tell their assistant to open fifty trial accounts and it will honestly declare itself user-initiated every single time, because it is telling the truth. The card cannot see that and does not claim to. What gives it away is the shape: one device across twelve addresses, fifty signups from one /24 inside an hour. Score the pattern, not just the request.